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RESTRICTED 
ECONOMIC WARFARE - THE DEFENSE 
A lecture delivered by 
Prof. Charles Cortez Abbott 
at the Naval War College 
November 9, 1948 
My subject this morning is Economic· Warfare-The De­
fense. In particular I �hall address myself to problems concern­
ing the defense of the United States and her allies-actual or po­
tential-in the present "cold war" and in the event hostilities 
break out between this country and Russia. 
There appear to be three distinct aspects of this subject 
that merit attention. In the first place, there is the protection, in 
a physical sense, of the United States and her allies and of the areas 
from which they draw essential war materials. In other words, 
economic defense of the United States must include defense of more 
than the territories within our natural boundaries. There are geo­
graphical areas important to us in the light of political and economic 
considerations which from the point of view of national interest 
must be def ended. In the second place, there is the maintenance 
and defense of the high level economy which the United States 
has maintained since V-J day. The protection of this condition is 
necessary, partly for strictly military reasons and partly because 
American prosperity is of great political consequence throughout 
the world. In the third place, there is the ideological conflict. There 
will not be time to say much about this aspect of the problem this 
morning. I would, however, like to say at this. point that under 
present conditions economic warfare is not simply a "battle for sup­
plies," as it was in World Wars I and II. It is also a struggle of 
Professor Abbott is Professor of Business Economics at Harvard 
University. His lecture entitled "Economic Warfare-The Attack" 
appeared in the February issue of "Information Service." 
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ideas, of achievements, of two opposed economic systems. In this 
ideological struggle, propaganda, which has always been a recog­
nized part of economic warfare, will probably play a larger part 
than it did in the Second World War. 
Since in my lecture a year ago I spoke in some detail regard� 
ing the problem of protecting a high level economy, most of my 
attention this morning will be devoted to the first aspect of that 
problem-the protection of the United States and her allies,. and 
particularly of the areas from which they draw supplies. 
Before examining particular facets of the problem it may 
be helpful if I give some of the background of my thinking on this 
whole general subject. It would appear that in the event of hos­
tilities many of our actual needs, political and economic, may not 
be greatly different from the needs of the Second World War, but 
the measures needed to satisfy them I presume might differ ap­
preciably. 
As regards supplies, it seems likely that the types and per­
haps the amounts of strategic and critical materials which we might 
need would not be greatly dissimilar to our requirements in the last 
war, although I would hope that the Emergency Shipping Priority 
List might be trimmed somewhat. One very interesting estimate 
that has come to my attention since my last talk, which was based 
on the resources available in areas one might expect would be 
controlled respectively by the United States and by the U. S. S. R., 
suggests that our chief shortages in the event of hostilities would 
be mercury, bauxite, manganese, and oil. I may add that this same 
estimate indicated that the chief shortages of the Soviets would 
likely be nickel, tin, copper and lead, tungsten, and of course, oil. 
Satisfaction of our needs will of course require the control 
of the sea lanes. While sea power might not be as useful for the 
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blockade of Russia as it was for Germany, it nevertheless would be 
of the highest importance-in order to assure this country and 
allied areas of a steady flow of supplies, in order to support ad­
vance bases from which attacks against Russia might be mounted, 
such as British East Africa and Cyprus, and in order to restrict 
the movement of enemy agents and of persons capable of induc­
ing subversive movements. I make this last point in full recog­
nition of the fact that the development of the airplane and the sub­
marine has made restrictions of the movements of enemy agents 
far more difficult than formerly. 
In the last war the phrase "Western Hemisphere Defense" 
was one of the common cliches. It has been suggested that in the 
event of hostilities we would probably have to add "Security of 
the North Atlantic Community" to this former objective, and I 
presume, the economic and military defense of other areas as 
well. Certainly the maintenance of relative economic stability in 
Latin America would be essential, partly because of physical prox­
imity, �artly because of the essential foods and raw materials 
which we would need to draw from that area. None of these pur­
poses, you will observe, can be attained without control of the sea 
lanes. 
As before, there will probably be a price attached to main­
tenance of economic and political stability in the areas important 
to us. In its simplest and perhaps its easiest form this price may be 
merely the extension of various- kinds of dollar loans . and credits. 
It is more likely, however, that the price will consist of things 
that these areas will want from us: shipping f:!pace, scarce materials, 
manufactured goods, and so on. It seems to me altogether prob­
able that the servicing by us of some so-called minimum standard 
of economic and business needs will be the price-if not of friend­
ship, at least of political and economic conditions that serve our in­
terest. Iceland presumably will want hay, fertilizer, agrfoutural 
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machinery, and manufactured goods; the East Coast of South 
America will want newsprint, coal, and steel ; South Africa will 
want railroad cars and mining machinery, as well as silk stockings, 
toilet paper, and dry cereals; Canada will want fats and oils, es­
pecially peanut butter. To push this thinking one step further, 
I would guess that Canada might ask not only for supplies but also 
for the maintenance in Latin America of outlets for her pulp, 
newsprint, and other products. 
I can readily conceive that the price of stability in certain 
colonial areas may be the purchase of entire crops or outputs of 
raw materials, conceivably even at premium prices. Some of these 
commodities may be needed in their entirety, but it is not realistic 
to think that we will be so lucky actually as to want all of them. 
In the last war the loss of the European market made the entire 
copper output of South America available to us and, as you know, 
it was bought here. The Metals Reserves Corporation alone in the 
four years ending Novembr 1, 1944, bought $400,000,000 of South 
American copper. Fortunately we needed this item, and it was 
available to us .. Maintenance of the Chilean economy, however, in 
a style somewhat better than that to which it was accustomed, was 
a fortunate by-product. I can readily conceive of this situation 
being reversed, so that the maintenance of the Chilean, or the 
South African, or the East African economy through commodity 
purchases might become the prime objective, and the acquisition 
of commodities a somewhat embarrassing by-product of the policy. 
The ability of our adversaries to frustrate these objectives 
will certainly be of a. somewhat different character and may be of 
somewhat larger dimensions than was the case in the Second World 
War. The mechanisms of economic penetration at the service of 
the Russians, which they are using and will use, are quite dissim-
ilar to those of the Nazis. There will not, presumably, be the prob-
lem of enemy-owned business concerns and trade connectio:ns, at 
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least not on the same scale. There is no' Russian counterpart to the 
I. G. Farbenindustrie. The problem of hidden or "cloaked" en­
emy assets will be of much smaller p�oportions. On the other hand,
it is doubtful if the Nazis ever commanded a fifth column of the pro­
portions of the Communist party and its sympathizers; the problem 
of loyalty, with its many ramifications, will be far more severe. 
In terms of the specific measures of economic warfare and penetra­
tion with which we shall have to contend, it is probably safe to 
assume that the amount of competitive buying of scarce materials 
in neutral markets will be reduced. While it may be ventured 
that the Russians have an adequate supply of gold to use as a means 
of payment in competitive buying, I would assume that they might 
be severely handicapped through lack of an effective world-wide 
network of trade connections. As far as I can determine, a system 
of trading relations and established commercial connections are 
almost if not quite as important for competitive or preclusive 
buying as is an adequate supply of the means for payment. 
Against this background of thinking we may now consider 
in more detail two of the aspects of the problem which I mentioned 
at the outset: maintenance of political and economic stability in 
areas important to the national interest of the United States, 
and preservation of a high level economy in this country. 
I shall not try to designate with any precision the areas 
which it will be important for us to defend. The forces that 
will determine these areas, however, are reasonably clear. There 
will be the countries which are our allies; there will be the 
interests of military strategy; there will be the areas from which 
we have to draw our essential supplies; a,nd particularly there will 
be the areas from which our Allies will have to draw their essential 
supplies. For example, the Argentine will be of more importance 
to Great Britain than to us because of the United Kingdom's de­
pendence upon Argentine beef, although this country will no doubt 
also need Argentine linseed and quebracho. 
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Evidently if we are to receive aid from these areas or give 
it to them, control of the means of transportation and communica­
tion will be essential. Maintenance of our position will be depend­
ent upon supremacy on the sea. While such control may be of 
less offensive significance than in the first two World Wars, its de­
fensive significance will be greater and, consequently, the threat 
of submarine attack may be of even larger moment. 
We can anticipate that economic attacks against our inter­
ests in "our" areas will be made. In general I suspect that the 
attacks will not be through what we might call "recognized" in­
struments of economic warfare-blockade, trade agreements, 
preclusive buying, and so forth-but will be intended to disrupt 
the smooth functioning of the productive process and the flow of 
trade. On the whole, it does not appear that Russia will be able to 
use effectively the recognized types of economic pressure; but she 
has at her disposal other means for accomplishing the same ends. 
Let me be more explicit. 
In the first two World Wars the United States and the 
United Kingdom employed shipping controls and preclusive buy­
ing to cut off supplies from Central European powers. A civil 
disturbance in South America, the Dutch East Indies, Burma, or 
Malaya, sponsored by Moscow, could be used for much the same 
purpose-to cut off supplies from the United States or the United 
Kingdom. This country and Great Britain have in the past used 
commodity purchase agreements to shape the economy of neutral 
and also colonial areas in such a way as to assist our war pro-
grams. Our interest at the present time and in the· future will lie 
in the maintenance of political stability and a continued production 
of necessary materials in these areas. The Russians are quite 
capable of various types of operation designed to thwart our in-
terests which is the same as saying that they have methods of
shaping the economic processes in these areas to t:heir purpose. 
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Strikes, sabotage, political unrest, inflation, or any other operation 
that reduces production or disturbs the normal tenor of business 
will serve the Russian .purpose, much as commodity purchase agree­
ments have served the purpose of this country and of Great Britain 
in the past. I make this point notwithstanding the fact that Rus­
sia is using trade agreements with her European satellites much as 
if she were a capitalistic power. In the last war we lost control of 
Southeast Asia, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines through 
Japanese conquest. If in these areas Communist or nationalistic 
movements sponsored by Moscow should spread, I can conceive that 
we might lose their resources almost as fully as if we had lost con­
trol of the areas themselves. It does not take great imagination 
to see that strikes in key industries and stoppage in key plants 
can have much the same effect on production as if those indus­
tries and plants were the object of strategic bombing. I was 
interested to observe that the November 1st issue of TIME carried 
a story to the effect that the coal strike in France was a political 
maneuver aimed at hampering the Marshall Plan and European 
recovery. The current strike of longshoremen in this country in­
itially had the effect of permitting us to supply· Alaska only by an 
air lift, and of putting extreme pressure on Hawaii; latterly it 
has had the effect of constricting shipments to Western Europe 
under the Marshall Plan. 
My conclusion may seem far-fetched, but I cannot see why 
an effort could not be made through a world-wide movement, partly 
Communistic and partly nationalistic, in colonial areas, to cut off 
the highly industrialized, raw material importing portions of the 
globe from supplies that are produced in those areas. There is 
already trouble in greater or lesser degree in Southeast Asia, the 
Near East, the Far East, and West Africa. Other parts of the 
world, such as North Africa and certain sections of Latin America, 
are clearly susceptible to this type of penetration. If such an ef-
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fort were combined with strikes and sabotage in key areas, notably 
in docks, harbors, and the maritime industries, it would seem to me 
that we might have a reasonable facsimile of a olockade. If, as many 
people think, in the next war strategy and operations will neces­
sarily be subject to logistics, disturbances in the areas from which 
supplies are obtained will come to have a new and a more sinis­
ter significance. 
While the North American continent is perhaps only mod­
erately vulnerable to this type of pressure, it is quite clear that 
certain other areas "on our side," notably the United Kingdom 
and parts of Western Europe, are distinctly vulnerable. Next to 
the coal shortage, probably· the major shortages in Western 
Europe and in the low countries are shortages of such imported 
items as fertilizers, leather, fibers, fats, and oils. Practically all 
of these items are of colonial origin. 
It may seem that I have belabored this point, but I believe 
it is of real moment and I wish to give two final examples of what 
I mean. Present plans for European aid assume, I believe, that 
by 1951 80 % of Europe's petroleum imports will come from the 
Middle East, and that by that date there will be a greatly in­
creased volume of European trade across the Iron Curtain. 
Clearly the validating of these assumptions depends much more 
on Russian action than on ours. It is inconceivable that Russia 
could not hamper shipments of petroleum from the Middle East 
if she so wished, and certainly the development of east-west trade 
in Europe depends directly on her policy. It follows of course, that 
if these assumptions of the European aid programs are not val-
idated there will be a commensurate increase in the economic 
pressure exerted on our economy; at the very least the present 
pressure will not be diminished. 
The conclusion of this line of thought is that the war po-
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tential of the United States and her allies is most easily attacked 
by indirection, and that the area most vulnerable to attack is in the 
peripheral sectors of Eurasia and in the colonial territories that 
furnish raw material. The kind of attack to be expected, it would 
appear, is a combination of measures not ordinarily looked on as 
the "orthodox" measures of economic warfare, but which would 
have the same purpose and could be highly effective. 
To meet this type of attack there are immediately evident 
tw<? countermoves : One is the continuance-or better yet the ex­
tension-of international trade and the present high level of 
prosp�rity. The other is stockpiling. I do not intend in this lecture 
to try to explore the first of these countermoves, but I do want to 
say a little something about stockpiling, and in this term I in­
clude off shore stockpiling as well as reserves built up in this 
country. 
, Stockpiling is of course one of the recognized, classical, or­
thodox measures of economic warfare. It is designed to circumvent 
the effect of a blockade, or at least to mitigate the effects of a 
sudden shortage of essential items. If it is. done on any large 
scale it must be done by governmental agencies, partly because 
of the amount of money involved (especially if premium prices are 
paid), partly because of problems involved in storing and handling, 
and partly because utilization of stockpiles must be geared in with 
whatever system of allocations and priorities is being employed. 
Although the operation must be financed and administered by 
government agencies, the operation must be conducted in close 
collaboration with industry if it is to be effective. 
It may be worth while to quote here some portions of the 
"Report on Activities of Metal Reserves Company" for the period 
June 28, 1940-November 1, 1944, signed by Charles B. Hender­
son, then president of the M. R. C. and chairman of the R. F. C. 
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The report covers the period prior to the creation of the United 
States Commercial Corporation. According to this report the 
M. R. C. contributed to the war effort in four ways:
"It has created stockpiles of metals and minerals that
provide assurance for continued production of military
goods, regardless of possible interruption of supplies."
· "It has assisted in increasing the total volume of metals and
minerals currently flowing into the war effort by making
available to industry, on allocation by the W. P. B., metals
and minerals from sources not available directly to private
industry."
"It has helped to stabilize prices ........ by selling at OPA 
ceiling prices" -even though it had bought at premium 
prices, above OP A ceilings or levels we might consider 
"economic." 
"It has contributed to the war program by reducing the 
strength of the foe through its purchases of supplies 
from sources available to unfriendly (later enemy) 
powers." 
As you know, the M. R. C. was originally set up to stock­
pile two commodities, tin and manganese; in the four years of its 
operation the list increased to 49. Its transactions covered 51 
foreign countries, 31 states of the Union, Alaska, and the Phil­
ippines. In addition to buying commodities it paid subsidies to 
marginal producers who were thereby enabled to produce and sell 
in the ordinary channels of trade at OP A ceiling prices. It set 
up subsidiary corporations to operate DPC facilities designed to 
produce scarce items. While a substantial number of the stock­
pile goals were met 100 % or more, a good many goals were not 
attained. Achievement of the goal, of course, does not tell the 
whole story of the operation, since sales were continually made 
from stockpiles during the period when they were being built up. 
I may observe here that some of the audits required of 
government corporations under the Corporation Control Act of 
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1945 are just now .becoming available. If we are to take these 
audits at face value, the stockpiling operation, so far as its book­
keeping was concerned, certainly left something to be desired. 
If such operations in the future are carried on on a large scale, 
here is surely one area where there is considerable room for im-
,·�rovement. 
The conclusion that I reach concerning stockpiling is that 
a limited amount, designed· to prevent a sudden interruption 
in supplies, may be very useful. But if events develop· in such 
a way that more than a moderate stockpile program is urged, or 
if substantial reliance is placed on this type of operation, such 
circumstances indicate that the economic war under either hot 
or cold conditions, is being lost. 
Let me turn to the second aspect of the problem which I 
mentioned at the beginning of this lecture, the defense of a high 
level economy. In my talk a year ago I took the line. that the 
present high level economy in the United States-with its record­
breaking national income, its "over-employment," its high tax 
receipts, and its large profits-was a fact of great political and 
economic consequence throughout the world. For three years we 
have had a most successful economy, more successful than any­
one could have hoped for in 1945 and certainly more successful 
than the best expectations of many of the "planners"· who fore­
cast much lower levels of production and employment. Except 
for price stability we have met all the tests of a successful econ­
omy given in the textbooks; we have had full employment and 
something more, record-breaking levels of production, a declin­
ing debt and burden of taxation, a high level of profits, ail in­
creasing volume of capital in".'estment, and a rising standard of
living. 
It is this high level economy which makes possible support of 
a $40 billion budget and a $250 billion debt, together with the 
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enormous "unrequited" exports of which shipments under the 
Marshall Plan are only a part. As you know, "unrequited" is 
the economists way of describing exports for which you are not 
paid. This high level economy has demonstrated to the world the 
volume of production possible under a free market economy, avail­
able either for armament purposes or for raising the standard of 
living of the population. In our "positional war" with the Soviets 
this achievement has been something that the Russians undoubt­
edly had not counted on. 
Unfortunately, a high level economy is a vulnerable econ­
omy. It is vulnerable either to a recession or to a final burst of 
inflation and speculation that makes a recession inevitable and 
more severe than might otherwise be the case. The Russians have 
confidently expected and predicted a recession. Should that occur 
it would weaken our tax base and our ability to supply raw ma­
terials, food, and capital equipment to Europe. It would seriously 
compromise the position of the United States on the international 
stage, since it would validate the Marxian prophecies. 
The Russians could-as could any state with sufficient re­
sources and particularly an authoritarian state-undertake from 
the outside measures to precipitate either a bust or the final states 
of a boom that precede a bust. In my lecture a year ago I 
mentioned certain maneuvers that could be undertaken for this 
kind of purpose, such as the disorganization of markets for in­
ternational commodities, the use of gold shipments for political 
purposes, and the falsification or misinterpretation of government 
statistics. 
The greatest danger, however, I believe lies in the pressures 
that can be exerted from the outside in this country on the fed­
eral budget, with the consequent repercussions on taxation, spend­
ing, and borrowing. I am so thoroughly convinced that the greatest 
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danger of overstraining the American economy lies here, in the 
problem of the big budget, that I vyill not even stop to argue the 
case. The methods available to the U.S. S. R. for exerting pressures 
in the field of "big government" and "big spending," both in foreign 
and domestic fields, are numerous. The implications of these 
. pressures are almost· infinite and extend far beyond the limits of 
this lecture. They involve not only the whole field of public finance 
and fiscal policy, but also a detailed consideration of how our econ­
omy works-down to, say, the adequacy of depreciation policies 
of individual companies. 
I will make only two observations as regards this type of 
pressure. Insofar as Russia, in what we may call the area of 
"foreign spending", can increase t�e needs for such things as 
ERP or European rearmament through political tensions, dis­
ruption of trade, diminution of production, or civil disturbance, 
the pressure on our economy is increased. This fact is now be­
coming generally recognized. On November 4, Edson Smith, the 
financial editor of the Boston Herald said: "It is becoming in­
creasingly apparent that whether by accident or design the Russian 
government is forcing us into a spending program which makes 
the achievement of a stable economy at home practically impos­
sible." The implications of such a situation, as I have indicated, 
are extremely serious. 
"The area of domestic spending'' seems to me to fall natur­
ally in the orbit of ideological warfare. Insofar as a public opin­
ion can be created which demands and expects big government 
spending for social security, farm parity prices, grants and aids, ' 
and so forth, the pressure on our economy will evidently be in­
creased. That is, the problem of the "big domestic budget" is es­
sentially one of domestic public opinion. If the public wants a 
large volume of spending there will be a large budget; if the pub-
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lie does not want such spending the budget . will be small.. The 
point of this line of argument, of course, is that public opinion 
in a foreign country is exactly what ideological warfare seeks to 
influence. 
In conclusion let me say that the framework, the setting, 
the logics, and the position of economic warfare in the present . 
cold war between the United States and the Russians are quite 
different from the situation prevailing in either of the first two 
World Wars. This is what might be expected on a priori grounds. 
The whole geography of the situation is different and it seems 
virtually impossible to blockade the Russians.· The U. S. S. R. is 
not so highly industrialized a country as Germany and not so 
susceptible to shortages of food and raw materials. Nor is it so 
dependent on foreign commercial connections and foreign trade. 
Consequently it is distinctly less susceptible to offensive measures 
of economic warfare, at least of the traditional type, than was 
Germany. On the other hand, in view of our logistic and ideological 
position, we are more susceptible to offensive measures of economic 
warfare than we were heretofore. We are particularly vulnerable 
to types of operations that lend themselves to the Russians' abil­
ities. This country, at least this country together with her allies, 
is very dependent on an even flow of supplies. Our national in­
terest lies in the preservation of "normal" economic activity and 
economic and political stability. Our interest in such stability is 
more intense and will extend over a wider area than was the case 
before. As an industrialized, highly integrated, capitalistic na­
tion with a delicate and delicately balanced economy, we are 
particularly susceptible to the effects of strikes, sabotage, civil 
disturbance in colonial areas. Some of these areas are no further 
away than Latin America. Ideological warfare evidently has played 
and will play a larger part in the situation than it has before. Con­
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will be, spent on defensive operations than on offensive operations 
designed to injure the Russian war potential directly. The Mar­
shall Plan is a case in point. 
Lest this should seem a pessimistic, unaggressive point of 
view, I may point out that few things can be so damaging to the 
Russian program, or at least large portions of it, as a failure on 
their part, because of the excellence of our economic defense, to ac­
complish the world wide proletarian revolution they have so con­
fidently predicted. They are in the position of having to validate 
.a prophecy. If the prophecy is not validated their ideological 
position is not likely to stand the disappointment. 
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